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RATIONAL INFORMATION CHOICE 





Adding a stage of signal acquisition to the expected utility model shows that Bayesian 
updating results in a well defined law of demand for financial information when asset return 
distributions are conjugate priors to signals such as in the gamma-Poisson case. Signals have 
a positive marginal utility value that falls in their number if and only if investors are risk 
averse, asset markets large, and variance-mean ratios of asset returns high in fully revealing 
rational expectations equilibrium. Expected asset price increases in the number of signals so 
that expected excess return drops. The diminishing excess return prevents Bayesian investors 
from unbounded information demand even if signals are costless, unless the riskfree asset is 
removed. Signals mutually benefit homogeneous investors because revealing asset price 
permits updating so that a Pareto criterion judges competitive equilibrium as not sufficiently 
informative. However, asset price responses make incentives for signal acquisition dependent 
on portfolios so that welfare and distributional consequences become intricately linked when 
investors are heterogeneous. 
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is a substantially extended version of a previously circulated paper entitled “Another look at 
information acquisition under fully revealing asset prices.” The role and value of information in ¯nancial markets ¯gures prominently in
theoretical and empirical research. Many approaches nevertheless treat ¯nancial
information as if it were exogenously available to investors. Literatures on learn-
ing and experimentation, on the other hand, analyze incentives for information
acquisition but frequently treat the asset or commodity markets on which in-
formation is obtained in abstract terms and tend to disregard equilibrium price
e®ects. This paper pays close attention to both rational incentives for informa-
tion acquisition in ¯nancial markets and to the e®ects of market conditions and
heterogeneous portfolio positions on incentives for information acquisition.
The approach pursues four main objectives. First, this paper aims to de-
rive a rational law of demand demand for ¯nancial information based on the
marginal utility bene¯t of signals in an expected utility framework. For this
purpose, the paper draws on Rai®a and Schlaifer's (1961) decision model under
conjugate prior distributions, which provides a natural extension of the expected
utility model of portfolio choice. A second objective is to move beyond the
abstract experimentation view of information acquisition and tie the marginal
utility bene¯t of ¯nancial information to the speci¯c asset market environment
and investors' portfolio positions. A third objective is to account for the impact
of information acquisition on an asset's expected excess return when evaluating
information in rational utility terms. A fourth goal is to apply a Pareto criterion
to the assessment of informational e±ciency of rational expectations equilibrium
(REE).
Whereas Wald's (1947) prominent experimentation paradigm gives rise to a
law of demand for information in a dynamic setting of repeated sampling with
risk neutral agents (Moscarini and Smith 2001), the Rai®a and Schlaifer (1961)
decision framework lends itself to a well de¯ned demand function for ¯nancial
information in a standard Walrasian REE with risk averse investors. In contrast
to conjectures of non-convexities in the value of information (e.g. Chade and
Schlee 2002), the law of demand for ¯nancial information passes three intuitive
litmus tests in this natural extension of the expected utility model: signals have a
well de¯ned and positive value in terms of marginal expected utility for risk averse
investors; when positive, the marginal expected utility bene¯t of signals falls
monotonically in the number of signals; information has no value for risk neutral
investors because they do not expect a change to their portfolio composition by
the Law of Iterated Expectations so that information is ex ante irrelevant for
their expected consumption path.
The present Bayesian model of information choice in ¯nancial markets estab-
lishes that the marginal utility bene¯t of a signal is low if relatively few risky
assets are in the market, or if investors are little risk averse, or if prior expec-
tations of the mean-variance ratio of the asset return are relatively high so that
2uncertainty matters little compared to expected returns. Information alters be-
liefs about the expected asset price. This changes the expected value of investors'
initial portfolios and intricately a®ects their individual marginal utility value of
information.
In REE, asset price serves a double role as asset allocator and information ag-
gregator. Rational investors only value signals ante notitias (before realizations
become known) if they anticipate to act on signal realizations post notitias (after
realizations are revealed to them). Otherwise information has no rational value.
However, by acting on information, investors leak information to all others since
an asset price that plays an allocative role at least partly reveals a statistic of
aggregate information. This makes other investors' beliefs about asset return
less uncertain, raises demand and price of the risky asset, and diminishes the ex-
pected excess return|an e®ect known for both partially revealing REE (Easley
and O'Hara 2004, Veldkamp 2004) and fully revealing REE (Muendler 2004).
Easley, Hvidkjaer and O'Hara (2002) con¯rm the diminishing e®ect of public
information on the expected excess return empirically. They ¯nd for a set of
NYSE listed stocks between 1983 and 1998 that assets exhibit a lower excess
return if public information matters relatively more for their valuation (so that
trades are less frequently private-information based). The present paper shows
for the benchmark case of fully revealing REE that this price impact of pri-
vately obtained but publicly transmitted information prevents rational Bayesian
investors from unbounded information acquisition even when signals cost noth-
ing. Only if the riskless bond turns useless (destroys the principal with certainty)
does unbounded information acquisition become rational for costless signals and
investors turn a risky asset into the riskless bond by removing all uncertainty
with in¯nitely many signals.
Informational e±ciency of REE is often de¯ned as the expected deviation
of market price from the benchmark price that incorporates a statistic of all
investors' beliefs (Fama 1970) or as the precision of price in that statistic (e.g.
Wang 1993). Endogenous information acquisition in the present framework gives
rise to a natural Pareto criterion based on individual ante notitias utilities, simi-
lar to the Samuelson (1954) condition for public goods. If information is valuable
under given market conditions, a social planner wants more information to be
allocated to homogeneous investors than markets provide, as is the case with
public goods in other economic contexts. Individual investors do not account for
the positive externality of their information acquisition on other investors who
can update their beliefs through revealing price. If, on the other hand, market
conditions are such that no investor acquires a signal in equilibrium then signals
must have zero or negative value and a benevolent social planner agrees with the
market outcome. However, the e®ect of signals on expected asset price has imme-
3diate distributional consequences when investors' endowments are heterogeneous
which makes it di±cult to separate purely allocative e®ects of information from
redistributive endowment revaluation e®ects.
In deriving a rational law of demand for ¯nancial information, the present
approach resorts to the benchmark case of fully revealing REE in which a suf-
¯cient statistic of all investors' information becomes publicly known through
price. Benchmark scenarios (such as perfect foresight, perfect competition, com-
plete markets or the conditions of the welfare theorems) have proven to be useful
tools for many ¯elds of economics in elucidating key relationships between ratio-
nal behavior and market outcomes. The benchmark case of fully revealing asset
price serves this purpose. Some markets such as that for foreign exchange may
indeed come close to the fully revealing benchmark. As Federal Reserve chairman
Alan Greenspan remarked at the 21st Annual Monetary Conference in Washing-
ton D.C. on November 20, 2003: \My experience is that exchange markets have
become so e±cient that virtually all relevant information is embedded almost
instantaneously in exchange rates to the point that anticipating movements in
major currencies is rarely possible." Crucial bene¯ts of the fully revealing REE
are its tractability in closed form and its clear-cut predictions of asset price re-
sponses. The key impact of information acquisition is its diminishing e®ect on
the asset's expected excess return in fully revealing REE. A non-revealing price,
at the other extreme, would require an in¯nite variance of exogenous noise in
price and preclude any allocative role of price. So, unless price loses its entire
allocative function, the diminishing e®ect of information on the expected excess
return will carry over in mitigated form to less than fully revealing REE.
Financial information often comes in discrete levels such as Standard & Poor's
or Moody's investment grades, or on a three-level buy-hold-sell scale. It there-
fore not only seems convenient but realistic to consider discrete signals. Poisson
distributed signals in particular exhibit several useful statistical properties. For
many draws, Poisson probabilities approximate binomial signal distributions. In
other words, a single Poisson signal approximates many individual thumbs-up,
thumbs-down signals. A gamma distribution of the asset return is the unique
conjugate prior distribution to Poisson signals so that closed-form solutions of the
¯nancial market equilibrium are guaranteed for all levels of information. Davis
(1993) presents an earlier model in ¯nance that employs the gamma distribution.
Special cases of the gamma distribution are the chi-squared, the Erlang, and the
exponential distribution, for instance. The prominence and success of the Nelson
(1991) exponential ARCH model in empirical ¯nance suggests that this is a par-
ticularly relevant family of return distributions. Realistically, gamma distributed
gross returns cannot be negative so that investors can never lose more than their
principal. Variants of the results with the Poisson-gamma signal-return distri-
4bution carry over to other conjugate prior distributions. Under a normal-normal
pair of signal-return distributions, for instance, asset price is fully revealing and
information acquisition occurs in the presence of an endowment revaluation e®ect
but unrealistically not in its absence (Muendler 2004, Theorem 4).
The joint equilibrium in signal and asset markets is called a rational informa-
tion choice equilibrium (RICE) and builds on common equilibrium de¯nitions:
a Walrasian REE for assets and a Samuelson (1954) style public-goods equi-
librium for signals. A Walrasian asset market REE is standard in literatures
on information acquisition (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980), on delegated portfolio
management (Bhattacharya and P°eiderer 1985), and currency attacks (Morris
and Shin 1998), for instance. When asset price fully reveals a su±cient statistic
of all investors' signal realizations, as will be the case in this paper, signals are
pure public goods ante notitias. Such a fully revealing REE can be viewed as
the limit of a sequence of partially revealing auctions (Reny and Perry 2003).
The public-goods character of signals is also common in models of experimenta-
tion (Bolton and Harris 1999, Cripps, Keller and Rady 2005). A ¯nite number
of investors assures that a RICE exists under fully revealing asset price|as it
does in the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model (Muendler 2004). So, despite its
intentional limitation to the fully-revealing benchmark equilibrium, the present
model shares key features with partially revealing REE models and gives rise to
empirically con¯rmed predictions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a
Bayesian model of rational investors' information and portfolio choice along with
general implications. Section 2 imposes constant absolute risk aversion and Pois-
son distributed (su±cient) signals for tractable, non-trivial solutions. Section 3
shows that a unique ¯nancial market equilibrium results. Every investor can
buy signals prior to portfolio choice. Section 4 analyzes this signal choice for
investors in the absence of wealth e®ects, shows that a unique equilibrium ex-
ists in the market for signals too, and discusses under what market conditions
information acquisition occurs in equilibrium. Section 5 discusses the implied
e±ciency properties of asset price under a Pareto welfare criterion. Section 6
introduces heterogeneity in investors' endowments of the risky assets. Section 7
relates the ¯ndings to the prior literature, and section 8 concludes. Some proofs
are relegated to the appendix.
1 Bayesian Information and Portfolio Choice
The rational Bayesian model of asset and ¯nancial information choice adds a
prior stage of signal acquisition to the standard expected utility model of portfolio
choice. There are two periods, today and tomorrow, and there are two assets:
5One riskless bond b and one risky stock x. Assets are perfectly divisible. The
riskless bond sells at a price of unity today and pays a real interest rate r 2
(¡1;1) tomorrow so that the gross interest factor is R ´ 1+r 2 (0;1). The
risky asset sells at a price P today and pays a gross return µ 2 £ µ R tomorrow,
where £ denotes the range of possible values.
Investors hold prior beliefs about the distribution of the risky asset return and
can acquire signals to update their beliefs. To create an image for the abstract
concept of information, one can liken signals in this framework to private detec-
tives and signal realizations to detectives' reports. In a strict general-equilibrium
sense, of course, there is only one class of agents in this model (investors) and a
signal is an investor's costly e®ort to update beliefs.
Markets for private detectives (signals) Si
n open at 9am today. Detective n,
hired by investor i, reports back exclusively to investor i with a signal realization
si
n before 10am. How many di®erent private detectives Ni should investor i
hire? Each investor knows that she will base her portfolio decision, to be taken
at 10am today, on the information that she is about to receive from her Ni private
detectives. She also knows the statistical distribution of the signals conditional
on the unobserved asset return. Naturally, she does not know the content of the
private detective's report when she takes her decision on information acquisition
(she does not know signal realization si
n). Otherwise she would not pay for the
information (the signal Si
n).
Assumption 1 (Risk and conditionally independent signals). The risky asset








While assets are assumed to be perfectly divisible, signals have to be acquired in
discrete numbers.1
The asset price at 10am will contain information. The reason is that each in-
vestor chooses her portfolio given her observations of signal realizations (fsi
ngNi
n=1),
and the Walrasian auctioneer at Wall Street clears the market by calling an equi-
librium price. In the benchmark case of a fully revealing equilibrium, the asset
price is invertible in a su±cient statistic of all investors' posterior beliefs and
hence permits the rational extraction of all relevant market information. This is
the case of analysis in the present paper.
1An informative signal distribution is invertible in µ. So, a continuum of signals would a.s.
reveal the realization of µ to informed investor. For markets to clear, P must equal µ=R in
this case, otherwise informed investors want to reshu²e their portfolio. But then the price
fully reveals µ itself and removes all uncertainty|an unrealistic case of little interest. The
inadmissability of a continuum of signals also clari¯es that there is a fundamental di®erence










































Figure 1: Timing of decisions and information revelation
The timing of decisions is illustrated in Figure 1. Every investor i is endowed
with initial wealth W i
0 ´ bi
0 + Pxi
0. At 9am, investors choose the number of
signals (private detectives) Ni. To do so, they maximize ante notitias expected
utility based on their prior beliefs before signal realizations become known (ante
notitias). Investors then receive the realizations fsi
1;:::;si
Nig of these Ni signals
(they get to know the content of the private detectives' reports) and update their
beliefs. When Wall Street opens at 10am today, investors choose consumption
today and tomorrow, Ci
0 and Ci
1, and decide how much of the risky asset to
hold. At this stage, they maximize post notitias expected utility based on their
posterior beliefs.2 The Walrasian auctioneer in the ¯nancial market sets the price
P for the risky asset such that the stock market clears. The bond market clears
given the interest factor R.


















will be available for consumption tomorrow.
2To clarify the timing of signal realizations, I distinguish between ante notitias and post
notitias expected utility. Ante notitias expected utility is di®erent from prior expected utility
in that the arrival of Ni signals is rationally incorporated in ante notitias expected utility.
Rai®a and Schlaifer (1961) favored the terms \prior analysis," \pre-posterior analysis" and
\posterior analysis."
7Assumption 2 (Expected utility). Investors i = 1;:::;I evaluate consumption














where u(C) is a strictly increasing and weakly concave function of C, and Fi
denotes investor i's information set.
Investor i maximizes expected utility (3) with respect to consumption Ci
0
today and Ci
1 tomorrow given (1) and (2). For ease of notation, abbreviate
investor i's conditional expectations with Ei [¢] ´ E[¢jFi] when they are based
on post notitias beliefs, and with Ei
ante [¢] ´ E[¢jFi
ante] for ante notitias beliefs
in anticipation of Ni signal receipts. Post notitias expectations coincide for all
investors under fully revealing price.
On the second stage, after having received the realizations of her Ni signals
fsi
jgNi
j=1 and updated beliefs to post notitias beliefs, each investor decides on asset
holdings and consumption given the asset price P. The two ¯rst-order conditions
at this stage can be summarized with the opportunity cost RP of holding the
risky asset in terms of holding the riskless asset (portfolio composition), and the
















where expectations Ei[¢] are conditional on the realizations of the signals and the








k=1 Nk;Fi) (where any two choices determine the third) are de-
cision rules that depend on the opportunity cost RP, on the observed number
of signals
PI
k=1 Nk that investors acquired, and on the information transmitted
through the signal realizations and price P given
PI
k=1 Nk. The choices of Ci¤
0 ,
bi¤ and xi¤ imply a level of post notitias indirect utility, which I denote with
Ui¤ = u(Ci¤
0 ) + ½iEi [u(Ci¤
1 )].
On the ¯rst stage, the investor chooses the number of signals she wants to
receive. She does this by maximizing ante notitias utility given her beliefs before
the realizations of the signals arrive. At this time she cannot know more than the
prior parameters of the respective distributions, but she builds her ante notitias
beliefs by taking into account how signals will likely change beliefs at 10am.
Ante notitias utility is Ei
ante [Ui¤] = Ei
ante [u(Ci¤
0 )] + ½iEi
ante [u(Ci¤
1 )] by the Law
of Iterated Expectations. The optimal number of signals Ni¤ 2 N0 maximizes
ante notitias utility Ei
ante [Ui¤].
In the spirit of competitive equilibrium, a rational expectations equilibrium
(REE) that clears both the asset market and the market for signals can be de¯ned
8as a Walrasian equilibrium at Wall Street preceded by a Bayesian public-goods
equilibrium in the market for detective services. This extension of REE to a
sequence of a rational Bayesian public-goods equilibrium in the signal market and
a subsequent Walrasian asset market equilibrium is called a Rational Information
Choice Equilibrium, or RICE.
De¯nition 1 (RICE). A rational information choice equilibrium (RICE) is an
allocation of xi¤ risky assets, bi¤ riskless bonds, and Ni¤ signals to investors
i = 1;:::;I and an asset price P along with consistent beliefs such that
² the portfolio (xi¤;bi¤) is optimal given RP and investors' post notitias be-
liefs for i = 1;:::;I,
² the market for the risky asset clears,
PI
i=1 xi¤ = I¹ x, and
² the choice of signals Ni¤ is optimal for investors i = 1;:::;I given the sum
of all other investors' signal choices
P
k6=i Nk;¤ and a marginal signal cost
c.
¹ x denotes the average risky asset supply per investor.
Rational Bayesian investors choose their demand for signals given the ex-
pected asset market REE at Wall Street under anticipated information revela-
tion. The equilibrium in the market for signals is the benchmark public-goods
equilibrium following Samuelson's (1954) de¯nition, where agents know other
agents' total demand for the public good at the time of their decision.
This expected utility framework immediately implies that, irrespective of
whether asset price is fully revealing or not, demand for signals is strictly positive
only if investors care about risk and information a®ects risk in a broad sense.
Lemma 1 (Necessary conditions for utility bene¯t of signals). Suppose signals
are costly, c>0. Then an investor acquires a signal in a RICE only if she is not
risk neutral under assumptions 1 and 2.




1 ]. For a risk neutral investor to neither demand a
positively nor a negatively in¯nite number of assets, Ei [µ] = RP and R = 1=½i
in a RICE. Thus, ante notitias utility becomes Ci¤
0 + ½iEi
ante [Ci¤
1 ] = W i
0 ¡ cNi
by (1) and (2). Ex ante utility of a risk neutral investor is independent of the
portfolio composition. As a result, signals only cause costs, but do not have a
bene¯t, which proves the ¯rst statement.
A risk neutral investor is indi®erent whether she holds a risky stock or a
riskless bond in her portfolio. Hence, she expects her actions upon signal real-
izations to yield the same return ex ante as yields no action at all, which makes
9signals useless to her. Lemma 1 casts doubt on the generality of information
acquisition models with risk neutral investors (e.g. Jackson 1991, Barlevy and
Veronesi 2000) and suggests that results in the literature on optimal experimen-
tation, where agents are risk neutral too, are limited to non-¯nancial markets.
Lemma 1 also highlights that information is not a good or bad in its own right.
It has a utility bene¯t only if it a®ects decisions. This suggests that market
conditions will matter for the value of signals|a theme to be investigated in
detail.
2 Risk Aversion and Conjugate Updating
Constant absolute risk aversion relates utility closely to properties of the return
distribution.
Assumption 3 (CARA). Investors have constant absolute risk aversion.
Under CARA, period utility becomes u(C) = ¡expf¡ACg < 0, where A > 0 is
the Pratt-Arrow measure of absolute risk aversion. For expected CARA utility to
exist, the return distribution must have a moment generating function (MGF).
The MGF of a random variable Z is de¯ned as MZjFi(t) ´ E[expftZgjFi] 2












2.1 Common priors and risk aversion
To analyze the utility bene¯t of signals, given expected price responses to sig-
nal realizations in general equilibrium, it is instructive to consider the case of
investors who are identical in beliefs and risk aversion. This homogeneity will
make price fully revealing.
Assumption 4 (Common priors and risk aversion). Investors have identical
prior beliefs about the joint signal-return distribution and share identical param-
eters of risk aversion.
So, assumption 4 limits possible di®erences in Fi across investors to post notitias
di®erences.















10where the prime in M0
µ(t) denotes the ¯rst derivative of the MGF with respect
to its argument t and Hi ´ expf¡A[(1+R)bi + Pxi¤ ¡ W i
0 ¡ cNi]g. The ¯rst
relationship in (5) can also be viewed as the inverse demand function for the risky
asset xi¤. The inverse demand function intersects with the price axis at RP =
E[µ] for xi¤=0, strictly falls in xi¤ by the second-order conditions (appendix A),
and is independent of W i
0 by CARA. Bond demand bi 2 R varies to satisfy the
wealth constraint.
Using (5) in utility (3) for CARA yields post notitias expected utility





















after a round of simpli¯cations, where ±i ´ 1+R
R (½iR)
1
1+R. For the choice of the
number of signals Ni, investors evaluate ante notitias expected utility, which
becomes
Ei

























for given R. For common priors and CARA by assumption 4, a symmetric
equilibrium implies that all investors expect an identical asset demand x¤ ante
notitias.
The second-order conditions (appendix A) and general properties of MGFs
impose little structure on (7). An instructive closed-form analysis of information
acquisition demands speci¯c distributional assumptions.
2.2 Financial information and conjugate updating
Financial information often comes in discrete levels such as Standard & Poor's or
Moody's investment grades, or on a three-level buy-hold-sell scale.3 It therefore
appears not only convenient but realistic to consider discrete signals. Poisson
distributed signals in particular exhibit several useful statistical properties. The
sum of Ni conditionally independent Poisson signals, for instance, is itself Poisson
distributed with mean and variance Niµ (appendix B). For a large number of
draws and small probabilities, Poisson probabilities approximate binomial signal
distributions (Casella and Berger 1990, Example 2.3.6).
3The amount of words to describe investment prospects is discrete and ¯nite. Even quotes
of asset prices at Wall Street used to be reported as common fractions, and decimals continue
to make price quotes discrete in a strict sense.
11Assumption 5 (Poisson distributed signals and conjugate updating). Signals
are Poisson distributed and update the prior distribution of the asset return µ to
a posterior distribution from the same family.
A gamma distribution of the asset return, µ » G(®i;¯i), uniquely satis¯es as-
sumption 5 (Robert 1994, Proposition 3.3). The distribution parameters ®i and
¯i are speci¯c to investors' beliefs in principle. The parameter ®i is sometimes
referred to as the shape parameter and 1=¯i as the scale parameter.
Distributions that are closed under sampling so that prior and posterior dis-
tributions belong to the same family are called conjugate prior distributions.
The gamma distribution is a conjugate prior to the Poisson distribution.4 A
gamma distributed asset return exhibits the additional advantage that its sup-
port £ µ R+ is strictly positive so that, realistically, negative returns cannot
occur. In contrast, a normal asset return would imply that stock holders must
cover losses beyond the principal (µ < ¡P) with a strictly positive probability.
Moreover, the gamma-Poisson pair of distributions does not have an additive
signal-return structure (Muendler 2004)|contrary to the normal-normal pair of
signal-return distributions|so that signals can raise utility even in the absence
of endowment revaluation e®ects of information (section 4).
Useful properties of the Poisson and gamma distributions are reported in
appendix B. The most important property relates to the updating of beliefs.
Fact 1 (Conjugate updating). Suppose the prior distribution of µ is a gamma
distribution with parameters ¹ ® > 0 and ¹ ¯ > 0. Signals Si
1;:::;Si
Ni are indepen-
dently drawn from a Poisson distribution with the realization of µ as parameter.
Then the post notitias distribution of µ, given realizations si
1;:::;si
Ni of the sig-
nals, is a gamma distribution with parameters ®i = ¹ ®+
PNi
n=1 si
n and ¯i = ¹ ¯+Ni.
Proof. See Robert (1994, Proposition 3.3).
The MGF of a gamma distributed return is Mµj®i;¯i(t) = [¯i=(¯i ¡ t)]
®i
(ap-
pendix B). So, the mean of a gamma distributed return µ is ®i=¯i, and its
variance ®i=(¯i)2. The mean-variance ratio will play a key role in particular:
Ei [µ]=Vi (µ) = ¯i.
For risk averse investors to have an incentive for signal acquisition, it is im-

















¹ ® + ¹ ®
¹ ¯Ni
(¹ ¯ + Ni)2
!
= ¡
¹ ® + ¹ ®
¹ ¯Ni
(¹ ¯ + Ni)3 < 0
4The gamma distribution is also a conjugate prior distribution to itself and a normal dis-
tribution, for instance.
12(by fact 3, appendix B). Risk averse investors not only expect a lower variance of
the risky asset return but also look forward to making a more educated portfolio
choice at 10am post notitias. Anticipating this improved portfolio choice at 9am,
investors consider information acquisition a means of reducing the ante notitias
variance of tomorrow's consumption.
Both the mean and the variance of a Poisson distributed signal Si with pa-







ante = ¹ ¯=¹ ® depends solely on individual priors and is com-
mon to all investors as assumption 4 requires.












by ¯rst-order condition (5) and the MGF of the gamma distribution (fact 4 in
appendix B). Demand for the risky asset decreases in price and the riskless asset's
return; demand is the higher the less risk averse investors become (lower A) or
the higher the expected mean-variance ratio ¯i of the asset is. Investors go short
in the risky asset whenever their return expectations fall short of opportunity
cost, Ei [µ] < RP, and go long otherwise. Under CARA, demand for the risky
asset is independent of wealth W i
0.
The term Ei [µ ¡ RP]=RP is an individual investor i's expected relative excess
return over opportunity cost. Risk averse investors demand this premium.5 For
later reference, de¯ne the expected relative excess return as
»
i ´
Ei [µ] ¡ RP
RP
. (9)
The expected relative excess return »i has important informational properties
that crucially a®ect incentives for information acquisition.
3 Financial Market Equilibrium
The utility bene¯t of signals depends on the expected equilibrium at Wall Street
and asset price responses to signal realizations in that equilibrium. To solve for a
RICE backwards, restrict attention to the partial REE at Wall Street ¯rst, given
any market equilibrium for private detectives. Investors i = 1;:::;I have received
the realizations of their conditionally independent Ni ¸ 0 signals. It is 10am,
5The (absolute) expected relative excess return Ei [µ ¡ RP] is unrelated to the expected
relative excess market value Ei £
RP ¡ Ei [RP]
¤
in the sense of (Fama 1970). Financial markets
are strong-form e±cient in this model so that Ei £
RP ¡ Ei [RP]
¤
= 0.
13and investors choose portfolios (xi¤;bi¤) given their post notitias information sets
Fi.
In REE, rational investors not only consider their own signal realizations.







n are correlated in equilibrium, the post notitias distribution of
the asset return, based on this information set, can be complicated. If price P
is fully revealing, however, the information sets of all investors coincide: Fi = F
for all i. This gives the rational beliefs in REE a closed and linear form analogous
to fact 1.
Investors are identical in their degree of risk aversion and in their prior be-
liefs by assumption 4. If they also know market size, asset price becomes fully
revealing.
Assumption 6 (Known market size). The total supply of the risky asset ¹ x and
the total number of investors I are certain and known.
Under these assumptions and by de¯nition 1 of RICE, ¯nancial market equilib-
rium takes the following closed form.
Proposition 1 (Unique asset market REE). Under assumptions 1 through 6,
the asset market REE in RICE is unique and symmetric with
®







n ´ ®, (10)
¯











where xi¤ = ¹ x and »i = » ´ A¹ x=¯.
Proof. By (8) and for beliefs (10) and (11), xi¤ = ®=(ARP)¡¯=A for all i. So,
market clearing xi¤ = ¹ x under de¯nition 1 of RICE implies (12).
Uniqueness of beliefs (10) and (11) follows by construction. By (8) and






for an appropriate choice of constants T0;T1 > 0 because risk aversion A is


















n are Poisson distributed by fact 3
14(appendix B) and conditionally independent given µ, a rational investor must ap-













k6=i Nk is known by de¯nition 1 of RICE.





n signals can get revealed in REE. Suppose
one signal si
n is received by some investor i but does not enter price. Then,
investor i cannot have based demand xi¤ on that signal since market clearing PI
k=1 xk;¤ = I¹ x would have transmitted si
n to price. However, if ®i does not
include si
n, Bayesian updating following fact 1 is violated, which is ruled out in
an REE.
The equilibrium price P fully reveals aggregate information of all market




n. This is a su±cient statistic for every moment of µ given
PI
i=1 Ni
(which is known by de¯nition 1 of RICE). In general, the equilibrium price is
fully revealing if and only if assumptions 1 through 6 are satis¯ed (corollary 1.1
in appendix C restates this formally).






coincide by (10) and (11). Consequently, the expected relative excess return















The expected relative excess return over opportunity cost Ei [µ¡RP]=RP is
crucial for individual incentives to acquire information. Information acquisition
diminishes the expected relative excess return. Equilibrium price P will reveal
signal realizations. So, private information will become publicly known to in-
vestors through informative price and risk averse investors will value the risky
asset more, thus bidding up price. Therefore, investors expect higher opportu-
nity cost of the risky asset Eante [RP] in the face of reduced uncertainty. The
diminishing e®ect of public information on the expected relative excess return
also occurs in additive signal-return models for any distribution with a moment-
generating function (Muendler 2004) and when price is partially revealing (Easley
and O'Hara 2004, Veldkamp 2004).
Proposition 2 (Diminishing expected excess return). Under assumptions 1
through 6, the expected relative excess return » in asset market REE strictly
falls in the number of signals, while the expected opportunity cost of the risky
asset Eante [RP] strictly increases in the number of signals ante notitiam.
15Proof. Note that » = Eante [»] by (13). The number of signals ¹ N =
PI
k=1 Nk
strictly diminishes » by (13). The number of signals strictly raises Eante [RP] =
(¹ ® + ¹ ® ¹ N=¹ ¯)=(A¹ x + ¯) since @Eante [RP]=@ ¹ N = »=¯2(1 + »)2 > 0.
4 Information Market Equilibrium in the Ab-
sence of Endowment Revaluation
Given the expected ¯nancial market equilibrium, how much information do in-
vestors acquire in RICE? Investors dislike the diminishing e®ect of information
on the expected relative excess return » but anticipate a more educated portfo-
lio choice if they can receive signal realizations. In their ante notitias choice of
the optimal number signals, risk averse investors weigh the diminishing excess
return and the marginal cost of a signal against the bene¯t of a more informed
intertemporal consumption allocation.
The acquisition of signals changes asset price ante notitias by proposition 2.




signals. To investigate incentives for information acquisition in the absence of
the wealth e®ect, this section considers homogeneous investors with xi
0 = 0.
Section 6 will present the general case. For now, there is a sole (foreign) agent
who o®ers the risky asset (xI
0 = I¹ x) and is considered irrelevant for information
acquisition. Section 6 will show that the sole owner of the risky asset may indeed
not acquire any signal herself.
Investors evaluate ante notitias expected utility for their signal choice. How-
ever, ante notitias expected utility (7) has no closed form unless R is constant.
Assumption 7 assures this.
Assumption 7 (Single-price responses to signal realizations). The equilibrium
price of an asset only responds to signal realizations on its own return.
The assumption is equivalent to the limiting case where markets for single risky
assets are small relative to the overall market for riskless bonds so that single
signal realizations alter R negligibly little (see appendix D for a formal deriva-
tion). Economies with large safe forms of debt such as government debt and
small open economies are examples.
For Poisson-gamma signal-return distributions and homogeneous investors
with xi

































16(see appendix E). The cost of signals cNi enters (14) in the form of an initial
wealth reduction. The last factor in (14) captures the e®ect of the relative excess
return » 2 (0;»] on utility. The term (1 + »)exp(¡»=(1 + »)) strictly exceeds
unity since, by (13), » > 0 for arbitrarily large but ¯nite numbers of signals PI
k=1 Nk ¸ 0. Hence, the last factor in (14) is well de¯ned.
Although the number of signals must be discrete, one can take the derivative
of ante notitias utility with respect to Ni to describe the optimal signal choice.
Strict monotonicity of the ¯rst-order condition in the relevant range will prove
this to be admissible. Di®erentiating (14) with respect to the number of signals
yields the incentive to purchase information. As long as @Ei
ante [Ui¤]=@Ni > 0,
investor i will generically purchase more signals. If @Ei
ante [Ui¤]=@Ni · 0 for
all Ni, she purchases no information at all. Taking the derivative of (14) with
respect to Ni, and dividing by ¡Ei






































The ¯rst term on the right hand side of (15) is negative and represents the
marginal cost of a signal (MC). The second term expresses the potential marginal
bene¯t of a signal (MB) and can be positive or negative. The incentive for
information acquisition does not depend on an investor's patience.
Rational investors view the choice of the total number of signals
PI
k=1 Nk as
the converse of a choice of the expected relative excess return » because » strictly
monotonically falls in the number of signals by proposition 2. This constitutes
a fundamental trade-o® behind the potential marginal bene¯t MB of a signal.
In fact, an additional signal can diminish the expected relative excess return »
so strongly that this negative e®ect more than outweighs the bene¯ts of infor-
mation. In the case of a normal-normal pair of signal-return distributions, the
diminishing e®ect of information on the expected excess return can be shown to
always outweigh the bene¯t unless there is an endowment revaluation e®ect (a
corollary of Muendler 2004, Theorem 4). For a Poisson-gamma pair of distribu-
tions, however, the numerator of the MB term in (15) can take either a negative
or a positive sign while the denominator is always positive.
The potential marginal bene¯t MB of a signal turns negative when the ex-
pected relative excess return » ´ (E[µ]¡RP)=RP drops too low. The potential
bene¯t MB does not constitute a bene¯t but a cost in this range. Note that a
low » means that investors currently hold relatively many signals given market
17size and the expected mean-variance ratio of the asset. The negative MB for low
» re°ects that, given a relatively large number of available signals, the negative
e®ect of an additional signal on the expected relative excess return » outweighs
the bene¯t from a more informed expected portfolio choice ante notitias. The
diminishing e®ect of an additional signal on the expected relative excess return
is particularly strong for investors with no endowment of the risky asset (xi
0 = 0)
since the increase in the opportunity cost RP is not mitigated by any positive
wealth e®ect of asset price on their endowments. As a consequence, every addi-
tional signal lowers an investor's ante notitias utility once the available amount
of information has driven » below a certain level (»).
Proposition 3 (Potential marginal signal bene¯t in the absence of endowment
revaluation). Under assumptions 1 through 7 and in the absence of endowment
revaluation, the following is true for the potential marginal bene¯t MB(») of a
signal.
² The potential marginal bene¯t MB(») attains strictly positive values if and
only if » > », where » 2 (0;1) is independent of » and uniquely solves
MB(») = 0 given R2(0;1).
² If » < » then, in the range » 2 [»;»], the marginal signal bene¯t MB(»)
strictly monotonically increases in » and is unbounded for arbitrarily large
».
Proof. See appendix F for the general case and set xi
0 = 0.
Figures 2 through 4 depict the marginal signal cost (MC) and potential marginal
bene¯t of a signal (MB) under varying parameters.6
For a strictly positive interest factor R, MB turns positive at one unique
point » > 0 and subsequently increases unboundedly in ». The unique zero
point » solves MB(») = 0 and is independent of » (and ¹ ®; ¹ ¯). In contrast to
examples of non-convexities (Chade and Schlee 2002), the value of information is
well behaved in the rational Bayesian model of ¯nancial information acquisition.
In the range where signals have positive utility value, the marginal bene¯t MB
of an additional signal strictly monotonically falls. Ante notitias expected utility
is thus strictly concave in signals in the relevant range.
Under what conditions do investors acquire information? Figure 2 shows a
case. As investors acquire signals, » moves away from » and to the west. The
6Parameters underlying the bene¯t curves in Figures 2 through 5 are A = 2, ¹ ® = 1:3, ¹ ¯ = 1,
and R = 1:1. The level of » depends on average asset supply, which is ¹ x = 7 in Figures 2, 6, 7
and 5; ¹ x = 3 in Figure 3; and ¹ x = 1 in Figure 4. Marginal cost is given by c = :1, A, and R in
Figures 2, 3 and 7.
18MB,MC






The expected relative excess return » strictly decreases in the number of signals
P
i Ni.






Figure 2: Information acquisition in equilibrium
potential marginal bene¯t MB curve has a long arm in the positive range that
slopes strictly upward by proposition 3. So, as long as » is large enough, there
is a strictly positive expected relative excess return »¤ at which the marginal
bene¯t MB of a signal equals marginal cost MC. Although the relative excess
return could attain any real value in principle, signals are not perfectly divisible.
As a consequence, the precise optimal number of signals will yield an expected
relative excess return in an open interval around »¤.
Since the expected relative excess return » cannot exceed », such an interior
equilibrium can only occur if » is su±ciently large. Hence, investors will acquire
a strictly positive amount of information only if the ¯nancial market meets the
following two conditions. First, supply of the risky assets needs to be strong
so that ¹ x is high. Then investors anticipate that they will invest a relatively
large portion of their savings in the risky asset, and information about the risky
asset return becomes relatively important to them. Second, investors need to
be su±ciently risk averse relative to their prior beliefs about the mean-variance
ratio of the risky asset so that A=¹ ¯ is high. Since the bene¯t of information stems
from lowering the prior variance of the portfolio, information matters more for
investors who are more risk averse.
So, the market environment determines whether information is valuable to
investors indeed. Information is not a good in itself. When » drops too low, the
potential marginal bene¯t MB of a signal cannot reach the point where it would
meet or exceed marginal cost, and nobody will acquire a signal so that »¤ = ».









The expected relative excess return » strictly decreases in the number of signals
P
i Ni.






Figure 3: No information in equilibrium due to high signal cost
half as compared to Figure 2). » is low if relatively few risky assets are supplied
to the market (low ¹ x), or if investors are little risk averse (low A), or when the
prior mean-variance ratio of the asset return is relatively high (high ¹ ¯) so that
risk matters little compared to payo®. Then investors do not value information
enough to acquire it.
What if signal cost drops to zero? Even then, there are market conditions in
which information has zero or negative value. Figure 4 depicts a case in which
the price of a signal c is zero but information would not be acquired (risky asset
supply is reduced to a seventh of the level in Figure 2). When the amount
of available information is large already, the price externality that diminishes
expected relative excess return » weighs more heavily than any positive e®ects
of more information on higher moments of the return distribution. The potential
marginal signal bene¯t MB is strictly negative and investors ¯nd information
undesirable even at zero cost.
The potential bene¯t MB vanishes as » goes to zero. In this limit, no investor
wants to purchase a costly signal. But every investor would accept signals for
free. The limiting level of » = 0 is reached when no risky assets are supplied
to the market (¹ x ! 0). Similarly, when investors become risk neutral (A ! 0),
or when the prior variance tends to zero (¹ ¯ ! 1), then there is no bene¯t
of holding information but also no harm done. Finally, if investors were given
in¯nitely many signals for free, » would reach zero but the return realization µ
would become known with certainty and the previously risky asset would turn
into a perfect substitute to the bond. The common cause for information to lose
20MB





The expected relative excess return » strictly decreases in the number of signals
P
i Ni.






Figure 4: No information in equilibrium due to market environment
its value in all these cases is that the relative excess return » is driven down to zero
so that no investor chooses to hold any risky asset. In this limit, information does
not have a negative value either. Investors are simply una®ected. If investors
don't think at 9am that they will be holding a risky asset at 10am, they know
they will never need to act upon information. An in¯nite amount of information
makes investors indi®erent to it in the presence of a riskless alternative asset.
Proposition 4 (RICE in the absence of endowment revaluation). Under as-
sumptions 1 through 7 and in the absence of endowment revaluation, a RICE
has the following properties for any R2(0;1).
² Investors acquire a strictly positive and ¯nite number of signals in signal
market equilibrium if and only if the asset market environment satis¯es
» > », where » >
p
1 + 1=R solves MB(») = 0.
² If the cost of a signal is strictly positive, then the market equilibrium for
signals is unique up to a permutation of the signal allocation.
² If the cost of a signal is nil but R > 0, then there are two signal mar-
ket equilibria, one of which involves an in¯nite amount of freely received
signals.
Proof. Under assumptions 1 through 7, investors acquire a strictly positive
amount of signals if and only if » falls in the range of » where marginal bene¯t
21MB is strictly positive (proposition 3). So, » > » >
p
1 + 1=R, where » solves
MB(») = 0.
For c > 0, the equilibrium number of
PI
k=1 Nk;¤ must be unique because the
positive arm of the marginal bene¯t MB in (15) strictly monotonically increases
in » by proposition 3. If »¤ ¸ », the unique information equilibrium entails no
information acquisition and »¤ = ». As » increases, there will be a unique infor-
mation equilibrium with exactly one acquired signal since the marginal bene¯t
MB in (15) strictly monotonically increases in » (proposition 3). As » moves
further up, there will be a new and unique information equilibrium with exactly
two acquired signals for the same reason, and so forth. Only the sum
P
k Nk is
unique but the equilibrium assignment of signals to investors is not.
If c = 0, there is a second equilibrium at » = 0, in which
PI
k=1 Nk ! 1
while another equilibrium continues to exist for R>0.
The equilibrium does not determine how many signals a single investor holds.
In equilibrium, one investor may acquire all
P
i Ni signals while nobody else
buys any signal, or all investors may hold the same number of signals. Signals
are public goods and therefore perfect strategic substitutes under fully revealing
price because any fellow investors' signal is as useful (or detrimental) as an own
signal.
By propositions 3 and 4, there is always a market size ¹ x, or a degree of risk
aversion A, or a level of the prior mean-variance ratio of the risky asset ¹ ¯ behind
» so that a costly signal becomes worthwhile to acquire in equilibrium.
Corollary 4.1 points to the degenerate limiting case where the interest rate of
the bond becomes in¯nite R!1 (and the potential bene¯t curve coincides with
the horizontal axis). Then investors are completely indi®erent to free information
since they would never hold a risky asset but investors do not demand costly
signals. When, at the other extreme, the bond becomes entirely worthless and
eliminates the principal for sure (r =¡1;R=0), investors do not want to hold
the bond in their portfolio. In this extreme case, they would choose to acquire an
in¯nite amount of information about the risky asset as signal costs fall to zero.
So, if there is no riskless asset in the economy yet, investors desire to create
the riskless asset by acquiring in¯nitely much information about a risky asset in
RICE. In this sense, the riskless bond is the basic asset in ¯nancial markets.
Corollary 4.1 (RICE responses to riskless returns in the absence of endowment
revaluation). Under the conditions of proposition 4, the following is true for a
RICE.
² In the limit when R ! 1, an information market equilibrium involves no
information acquisition if signals are costly (c > 0).
22² For R ! 0, the marginal bene¯t MB of a signal is strictly positive at any
» > 0 and zero at » = 0. Then, if c = 0, there is a unique information
market equilibrium which involves in¯nite information acquisition.
Proof. The numerator of the marginal bene¯t MB term in (15) vanishes for
R ! 1, which proves the ¯rst statement. For R ! 0, the marginal information
bene¯t cannot drop below zero by claim 2 in appendix F. So, there is only one
equilibrium if c = 0, proving the second statement.
A ¯nite number of investors has well de¯ned incentives to acquire signals in
a rational Bayesian model under fully revealing price, as does a ¯nite number of
investors in additive signal-return frameworks such as the Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) model (Muendler 2004). However, information need not be desirable.
Proposition 4 and corollary 4.1 clarify that signals can turn from a public good
into a public bad as market conditions change. These market conditions are
captured by » and can be a®ected through R. In ¯nancial markets, informa-
tion is a tertiary commodity. Investors are concerned about consumption, the
primary good. Assets are mere means to the end of consumption, or secondary
commodities. Information, ¯nally, has value only if it helps investors make bet-
ter portfolio decisions with regard to these assets. In this sense, information is
a tertiary commodity. Consequently, the utility bene¯t of signals changes with
market conditions.
5 Informational E±ciency in Absence of En-
dowment Revaluation
The rational Bayesian framework permits the application of a Pareto criterion
to judge information allocation in ¯nancial markets. To investigate the informa-
tional e±ciency of RICE in its pure form, this section continues to consider the
absence of wealth e®ects of information and homogeneous investors with xi
0 = 0.
Put di®erently, the social planner of the present section ignores in the welfare
judgement of RICE the single investor who is the sole owner of the risky project
with xi
0 = I¹ x.
De¯nition 2 (Informational Pareto e±ciency) An allocation of xi¤¤ risky assets,
bi¤¤ riskless bonds, and Ni¤¤ signals to investors i = 1;:::;I is called information-
ally Pareto e±cient in a given market environment (»;R) if there is no other
allocation such that all investors are at least as well o® and at least one investor













The expected relative excess return » strictly decreases in the number of signals
P
i Ni.






Figure 5: Socially desirable information choice
It does not matter for this Pareto criterion that information can change from
a public good into a public bad. The criterion is conditional on a given market
environment. To investigate whether the RICE in section 4 is Pareto e±cient,
imagine a benevolent social planner who can dictate every consumer j to buy
exactly Nj¤¤ signals. This social planner maximizes
PI
j=1 Ei
ante [Uj] with respect
to fN1;:::;NIg. Thus, similar to Samuelson's (1954) condition for public good
provision, a benevolent social planner's ¯rst-order conditions for information






















































for any j 2 1;:::;I, written in terms of that investor j's utility. Thus, com-
pared to the privately perceived bene¯ts, the potential social bene¯ts SB that









> 1. Therefore, if information is a public bad,
a benevolent social planner wants to implement an even smaller amount of in-
formation than the private market. However, since no information is acquired in
24private markets in that case, the market equilibrium is informationally e±cient
when information is a public bad.
On the other hand, if information is a public good under given market con-
ditions, a social planner wants (weakly) more information to be allocated than
markets provide. Individual investors do not take into account that their sig-
nal acquisition also bene¯ts other investors through fully revealing price. In this
case, markets allocate (weakly) less information than desirable. However, signals
are not divisible and one cannot infer from condition (16) that a social planner
wants to implement strictly more information. It can happen that an additional
signal diminishes relative excess return » so strongly that all investors are worse
and not better o®. So, discreteness of the number of signals only permits a
conditional e±ciency statement up to discrete tolerance. In Figure 5, a social
planner wants to allocate information so that relative excess return is brought
down from around »¤ to around »¤¤. However, if an additional signal makes the
implementable level of » drop far below »¤¤, investors are better o® if relative
excess return » remains at the market equilibrium level around »¤.
Proposition 5 Under assumptions 1 through 7 and in the absence of endowment
revaluation, the following is true in a RICE.
² If » · », then the equilibrium is informationally Pareto e±cient.
² If c > 0 and at least one signal is acquired in equilibrium, then the equilib-
rium is not informationally Pareto e±cient up to discrete tolerance.
² If c = 0, then the equilibrium with ¯nite information is informationally
Pareto e±cient for R > 0, whereas the equilibrium with in¯nitely much
information is not Pareto e±cient.
Proof. To prove the ¯rst statement note that, if » · », information bene¯ts are
weakly negative by proposition 3 and a social planner would not allocate any
signal. For the second statement, if c > 0 and at least one signal is acquired in
equilibrium, then the equilibrium level of » (around »¤) must be strictly lower
than », and the marginal bene¯t term in (15) must be strictly positive. Then
the augmented marginal bene¯t term of the social planner in (16) must strictly
exceed marginal cost at the equilibrium level of »¤. Up to discrete tolerance,
increasing the number of signals by one augments the sum of investors' ante
notitias utilities.
For the third statement note that, if c = 0, the marginal bene¯t term in (15)
must be as close to zero in equilibrium as possible because investors must have
chosen a discrete number of signals such that » is as close to zero or » as discretely
possible. The equilibrium with ¯nite information always yields higher utility for
25all investors than the equilibrium with in¯nite information since utility losses are
incurred as » falls from » to zero by proposition 3.
Even if signals are free with c = 0, only the market outcome with ¯nite
information is e±cient but not the one with in¯nite information. In other words,
as long as the bond is valuable (R > 0), neither markets nor the social planner
want to remove uncertainty. The reason is that investors in incomplete markets
prefer having a second asset around that is not a perfect substitute to the bond.
Risk-averse investors want to hold risky assets that yield a positive excess return
» over opportunity cost. Only if the bond becomes useless and R ! 0 (r!¡1),
unbounded information is Pareto e±cient.
Most commonly, the informational e±ciency of ¯nancial markets is judged
with criteria that do not relate to welfare but to the degree of information trans-
mission through asset price. Fama (1970) discerns three degrees of market e±-
ciency in this welfare-independent sense: Strong, semi-strong, and weak. Prices
are fully revealing in RICE under assumptions 1, 4 and 6 (corollary 1.1). So,
Ei [RP ¡ Ei [RP]] = 0 and RICE satis¯es strong-form e±ciency. An alternative
statistically well de¯ned measure of the informativeness of a signal is its preci-
sion, the inverse of the ante notitias variance. Informational e±ciency in this
non-welfare sense relates to price as a source of information.




























i=1 Ni¤=¹ ¯)2 ¡ (1 + »)2
(
PI
i=1 Ni¤=¹ ¯)2 ,
each additional signal reduces the precision of the market clearing price if the
amount of pre-existing information
PI
k=1 Nk;¤ is small.
Proposition 6 (Precision loss of the price system). In asset market REE under
assumptions 1 through 6, the ante notitias precision of the price system decreases
with every additional signal if and only if
PI
k=1 Nk;¤=¹ ¯ < 1 + ».
The fact that precision of price can fall with the number of signals purchased
may seem surprising at ¯rst. However, each investor anticipates that she and
all others will respond to signals in their portfolio choice. From an ante notitias
26perspective, asset demand (8) can become more volatile with the anticipated





















by fact 3. Financial markets need to clear. So, every investor ends up hold-
ing ¹ x risky assets in equilibrium by proposition 4, irrespective of information.
Hence, market price has to fully absorb any demand moves that stem from in-
formation revelation. As a consequence, the variance of price can increase with
more information acquisition. When there is relatively little pre-existing infor-
mation
PI
k=1 Nk;¤, an additional signal will a®ect individual demands strongly
and thus add to the price's variance. If, on the other hand, a lot of information is
available already, an additional signal that gets fully revealed through price will
move investors' demands little. If investors receive many signals, an additional
piece of information is likely to con¯rm previous observations and tends to sta-
bilize demand. So, equilibrium price is expected to become less volatile with an
additional signal if the pre-existing information level
PI
k=1 Nk;¤ is high.
Rational investors completely internalize this change in price volatility when
they maximize their ante notitias utility. In that sense, the precision of price is
irrelevant for the Pareto e±ciency of RICE.
6 Information Market Equilibrium with Het-
erogeneous Investors
Signals raise asset price Ei
ante[P] ante notitias by proposition 2. So, investors who
are endowed with the risky asset xi
0 experience a positive endowment revaluation
e®ect of signal acquisition ante notitias. To distinguish between the diminishing
e®ect of information on the expected relative excess return » and the positive
endowment revaluation e®ect of information, it is instructive to de¯ne the relative







In the extreme that sections 4 and 5 considered, one investor j owned all assets
!j = I in the risky project, while all other investors i 6= j did not own any asset
initially (!i = 0).
For heterogeneous investors with arbitrary endowments xi







The expected relative excess return » strictly decreases in the number of signals
P
i Ni.






Figure 6: Information bene¯ts for investors with heterogeneous endow-
ments







































































So, the potential marginal bene¯t MBi of a signal depends on !i and is investor
speci¯c.
Figure 6 depicts the range of individual marginal bene¯t schedules MBi by
relative risky asset endowment !i 2 [0;I]. The schedule in the !i = 0 plane
is identical to that in Figure 2 (section 4). As the graph in Figure 6 shows for
28varying levels of !i, the basic monotinicity properties of the individual marginal
bene¯t schedules MBi resemble those of Figure 2 when investors had zero en-
dowments of the risky asset (proposition 3). For every investor, there is an
endowment-speci¯c cuto® level of the expected relative excess return »
i beyond
which the individual marginal bene¯t schedule MBi turns strictly positive and
increases in » unboundedly.
Proposition 7 (Potential marginal signal bene¯t). Under assumptions 1 to 7,
the following is true for the potential marginal bene¯t MB(»;!i).
² The potential marginal bene¯t MB(»;!i) of a signal attains strictly positive
values if and only if » > »
i, where »
i2(0;1) is investor speci¯c in !i but
independent of » and uniquely solves MB(»
i;!i) = 0 given R2(0;1).
² If »
i < » then, in the range »2[»
i;»], the marginal bene¯t MB(»;!i) strictly
monotonically increases in » and is unbounded for arbitrarily large ».
Proof. See appendix F.
Similar to proposition 3, proposition 7 shows that there is always a market size
¹ x, or a degree of risk aversion A, or a level of the prior mean-variance ratio of the
risky asset ¹ ¯ behind » so that, for any investor i with endowment !i, at least one
costly signal becomes worthwhile to acquire in equilibrium. However, incentives
for information acquisition vary with risky asset endowments.
Figure 7 depicts four sections of the graph in Figure 6, along individual
marginal bene¯t schedules MBi, for four relative risky asset endowments !i.
These sections could represent an economy with eleven investors, for instance,
where eight investors hold !i = 1=8 and one investor each holds !i = 0, !i = 1
and !i = 8.
Information demand is intricately tied to investors' risky asset endowments in
RICE. As proposition 8 below will con¯rm formally, there is a single dominant
investor with an above-average endowment of the risky asset. This dominant
investor's marginal valuation of signals dominates everyone else's valuation so
that she single-handedly determines the information market outcome. In the
sample economy of Figure 7, the average investor · with !·=1 has the strongest
incentive for information acquisition among eleven investors and continues to
acquire signals until the expected relative excess return » is diminished into a
neighborhood around »¤
·. All other investors would stop acquiring signals earlier:
at some expected relative excess returns »¤
! > »¤
·. The dominant investor ·'s
endowment revaluation e®ect is so strong that the individual marginal signal
bene¯t MB· never turns negative for any level of the expected relative excess
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The expected relative excess return » = ¹ »=(1 +
P
i Ni=¹ ¯) strictly decreases in
P
i Ni.
Parameters: A = 2, ¹ ® = 1:3, ¹ ¯ = 1, R = 1:1, ¹ x = 7, c = :1.
Figure 7: Information equilibrium for investors with heterogeneous en-
dowments
return ». Proposition 8 will show that the dominant investor is to be found in
an open set of investors with endowments of !·=1 and above.
However, for investors outside the open set of endowments of !· = 1 and
above, the individual marginal signal bene¯t MBi can turn strictly negative even
in the presence of the endowment revaluation e®ect. Figure 7 shows for !i=1=8
and !i = 8, for instance, that the individual marginal bene¯t schedules MBi
dip into the strictly negative range below some minimal expected relative excess
return »
i. For these investors, the endowment revaluation e®ect of information
does not generally outweigh the utility loss from a diminishing excess return. So,
when the distribution of risky asset endowments is very unequal so that many
investors hold risky asset endowments far from average, the dominant investor's
information choice may in°ict a strict negative externality on a majority of in-
vestors. If, on the other hand, investors' risky asset endowments are distributed
closely around the market average, the endowment revaluation e®ect makes sig-
nals similarly valuable to all investors.
30The preceding sections 4 and 5 considered a sole owner j of the risky project
with !j = I but ignored her incentives for information acquisition. The upper
left and lower right graphs in ¯gure 2 exemplify (for a sample economy with
I = 8 investors, seven of whom hold !i = 0 while one owns !j = I = 8 ) that a
sole owner may not value signals. In fact, the marginal signal bene¯t approaches
negative in¯nity for the sole owner of a risky project as her relative risky asset
endowment !j (the project size I¹ x) increases for a given average endowment ¹ x
(claim 4 in appendix G).
The individual marginal bene¯t of a signal in equation (18) involves the ex-
pected relative excess return » and investor i's relative risky asset endowment !i
in non-algebraic ways. Accordingly, proposition 8 can only state results for inter-
vals of endowments. Characteristics of the individual marginal bene¯t MB(»;!·)
in these intervals determine key properties of RICE when risky asset endowments
are heterogeneous.
Proposition 8 (Dominant Investor Valuation of Signals). Under assumptions 1
through 7, a RICE has the following properties for any R2(0;1).
² For any investor i with relative risky asset endowment !i 2 [0;I], there
exists a market environment » > »
i so that investor i acquires at least one
costly signal in equilibrium (c>0), where »
i > j!i¡1j
p
1 + 1=R¡!i solves
MB(»
i;!i) = 0.
² The individual marginal signal bene¯t MB(»¤;!·) is maximal in equilib-
rium for a unique dominant investor · with relative risky asset endowment
!·
maxMB 2 (1;1 + R(1 + »)). This investor determines the total number
of signals
PI
k=1 Nk;¤ in equilibrium and diminishes expected relative excess
return to »¤.
² The individual marginal bene¯t MB(»¤;!i) at expected relative excess re-
turn »¤ is strictly positive in an open interval ­+ of risky asset endowments
that includes [1;!·] ½ ­+.
² If the cost of a signal is strictly positive, then the market equilibrium for
signals is unique up to a permutation of the signal allocation.
² If the cost of a signal is nil but R>0, and if there is at least one investor
with a risky asset endowment !i 2 [1;!·], then the unique signal market
equilibrium involves an in¯nite amount of freely received signals.
Proof. See appendix G.
31There is a unique investor, with relative risky asset endowment !·
maxMB 2
(1;1 + R(1 + »)) for whom the incentives to acquire information strictly exceed
those of any other investor. For investors with relative risky asset endowments
below or above !·
maxMB, the diminishing e®ect of signals on the expected excess
return » weighs more heavily and the endowment revaluation e®ect does not
provide as strong an incentive for information acquisition. So, the investor with
relative risky asset endowment !·
maxMB determines the information market out-
come. This investor · will continue acquiring signals and diminish the expected
relative excess return » until the total number of signals
PI
k=1 Nk;¤ satis¯es her
¯rst-order condition (18) for signal demand.
Investors with endowments in an open interval around [1;!·] strictly bene¯t
from investor ·'s additional information choice since their marginal utility bene¯t
of signals is strictly positive and they do not have to pay for the public good.
However, information acquisition creates a two-group society of investors. The
endowment revaluation e®ect of more signals strictly outweighs the diminishing
e®ect on the expected excess return » for a ¯rst group of investors in an open set
­+ of relative risky asset endowments (which includes [1;!·] ½ ­+). Given the
choice of free signals, they would remove all uncertainty from the market|just to
enjoy the endowment revaluation. It remains a question for further research how
the cost of information acquisition would have to relate to endowment e®ects to
prevent unbounded information acquisition. For the second group of investors,
endowments are either too small or too large so that the diminishing e®ect on
the expected excess return starts to outweigh the endowment revaluation e®ect
at some small enough ». This second group su®ers a strict negative externality
on their ante notitias utility from the rush to information of the ¯rst group of
investors.
7 Related Literature
Radner (1979) and Allen (1981) lay the grounds for REE under fully or partly re-
vealing prices. These papers and a series of further contributions establish that a
fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium at Wall Street generically exists
for real assets (Jordan 1982, Citanna and Villanacci 2000a) in the absence of in-
formation acquisition (but not necessarily for nominal assets, Rahi 1995). Wang
(1993) and several other authors (e.g. Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz 2000, Citanna
and Villanacci 2000b) investigate the informational properties of REE|that is,
how partly or fully revealing prices aggregate exogenously available informa-
tion. Easley and O'Hara (2004) analyze how di®erential information a®ects asset
prices. However, these papers stop short of investigating the resulting incentives
for investors to acquire information in the ¯rst place.
32Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) introduce the acquisition of ¯nancial informa-
tion into Walrasian REE. While they refute the existence of a joint equilibrium in
signal and asset markets when there is a continuum of investors, a well de¯ned
joint signal and asset market equilibrium does exist in their model, as in any
model with additive signal-return distributions under CARA, for an arbitrar-
ily large but ¯nite number of investors (Muendler 2004). Similarly, the present
model of rational Bayesian information choice under conjugate prior updating
has a well de¯ned fully revealing equilibrium for a ¯nite number of investors.
In a setting of market makers, rather than in Walrasian REE, Foster and
Viswanathan (1993) and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1996) give investors a
choice of information. Their equilibrium concept resembles the one of Gross-
man and Stiglitz (1980) in that investors have only a binary choice of becoming
informed or remaining uninformed. While disregarding the market making pro-
cess and returning to REE for tractability, the present model gives investors the
choice of a number of signals and thus allows for the derivation of a well de¯ned
law of demand for ¯nancial information based on the marginal utility bene¯t of
signals.
Closely related recent papers of information acquisition in ¯nancial market
REE are Calvo and Mendoza (2000), who show that larger markets diminish gains
from information acquisition in the presence of short-selling constraints, Popper
and Montgomery (2001), who derive utility bene¯ts from information sharing
among investors, and Veldkamp (2004), who shows that ¯xed costs of information
acquisition can cause alternating low-price equilibria with little information and
high-price equilibria with much information. Related also are earlier models by
Jackson (1991) with risk neutral investors who set price, by Jackson and Peck
(1999) with risk neutral investors who submit demand functions, and by Barlevy
and Veronesi (2000) with risk neutral investors in a Walrasian REE. However,
the marginal utility bene¯t of signals is zero for risk neutral Bayesian investors
by the Law of Iterated Expectations. This casts some doubt on the generality of
results in models with risk neutral investors.
The present expected utility model of ¯nancial information choice under con-
jugate prior signal-return distributions lends itself to revisiting four issues that
were the subject of prior approaches: Conditions for unbounded information
acquisition, the strategic complementarity of signals, the relationship between
information acquisition and market size, and the response of price precision to
information acquisition.
² Contrary to the Burguet and Vives (2000) result for risk neutral investors
that unbounded information acquisition is prevented if and only if the
marginal cost of information is positive, the present model yields an equi-
librium with a ¯nite amount of information even if signals cost nothing.
33So, unbounded information acquisition is prevented if the marginal cost of
information is positive, but not only in this case. Moreover, bounded in-
formation strictly Pareto dominates unbounded information in the present
rational Bayesian model with incomplete markets. Only once the riskfree
bond becomes useless, wiping out the principal with certainty, do investors
prefer to remove all risk from a risky asset by receiving in¯nitely much
costless information.
² Being public goods (or bads depending on market conditions), signals are
perfect strategic substitutes in the present rational Bayesian model of in-
formation choice. This is in accordance with the Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) and the Burguet and Vives (2000) frameworks. Considering values
of subsequent signals, rather than the strategic interaction of players, Ad-
mati and P°eiderer (1987) call two signals complements (substitutes) if the
value of the second signal increases (decreases) after acquisition of the ¯rst
signal. Given partially revealing price Admati and P°eiderer (1987) ¯nd
conditions for complementarity because more private signals improve the
precision of the posterior belief about a statistic of everyone else's infor-
mation in asset price. Under fully revealing price as in the present paper,
acquired signals strictly reduce the marginal utility value of subsequent
signals.
² Grossman and Stiglitz (1980, conjecture 7) state that markets are thinner in
cases of very little or extremely much information. Foster and Viswanathan
(1993) consider a similar issue. In the present setup, one can turn the ques-
tion around and ask how the aggregate amount of information changes with
market size. The thinner markets are in the present rational information
choice model, that is the lower the average asset holdings per investor, the
less aggregate information is available in equilibrium.
² The response of the ante notitias precision of price to private information
varies in earlier models. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) conjecture that
\the more individuals who are informed, the more informative is the price
system" but cannot con¯rm this conjecture because positive and negative
e®ects o®set each other in their model, and informativeness of price remains
constant. Verrecchia (1982) con¯rms the conjecture in a competitive REE
under partially revealing price. The present rational information choice
model shows that the ante notitias precision of the price may rise or fall
with more information, depending on the amount of prior information.
From an ante notitias perspective, asset demand can become more volatile
with the anticipated arrival of information so that the expected allocative
34response of price may outweigh the expected informational role and a larger
volume of information may cause a loss of precision.
There is a large body of alternative approaches to investor behavior. Ben-
abou and Laroque (1992) and Avery and Zemsky (1998), to name but two con-
tributions, rationalize herding behavior in ¯nancial markets. Incentives for in-
formation acquisition have also been analyzed in abstract contexts of learning
and experimentation (Moscarini and Smith 2001, Bergemann and VÄ alimÄ aki 2002,
Cripps et al. 2005). However, none of those models can assign a rational marginal
utility value to signals in a market context since there is no anticipated REE re-
sponse of prices to signal realizations in these settings. Datta, Mirman and Schlee
(2002) consider a generalized optimal experimentation model in which signal re-
alizations are allowed to enter future payo®s directly, and not just through beliefs,
but do not explicitly account for equilibrium price responses to information. In
contrast, the present paper shows that both the asset market environment and
the distribution of risky asset endowments are intricately linked to the marginal
utility bene¯t of signals since signals alter ex ante expected equilibrium price
and thus change expected excess returns and endowment values.
8 Conclusion
This paper has shown that a well de¯ned rational information choice equilibrium
(RICE) in asset markets exists for an extension of the standard expected utility
model of portfolio choice to signal acquisition. While the equilibrium on the
signal acquisition stage that precedes the asset market equilibrium involves vari-
ables in non-algebraic ways, key properties of RICE can nevertheless be derived.
Most importantly, RICE establishes a law of demand for ¯nancial information
by which the marginal utility bene¯t of an additional signal is strictly positive
if and only if investors are risk averse, supply of the risky asset is su±ciently
large, and the prior mean-variance ratio of the risky asset is su±ciently low. The
positive marginal utility bene¯t strictly falls in the number of signals.
Financial information not only changes its utility bene¯t with market condi-
tions. In reducing uncertainty, ¯nancial information raises expected asset price
and thus also a®ects investors' portfolio positions ante notitias. So, the value of
signals is intricately linked to the distribution of risky asset endowments across
heterogeneous investors.
The rational Bayesian model of this paper can easily be generalized to a
model with a ¯nite number of assets and conditionally independent signals on
individual asset returns. The realism and convenience of the Poisson-gamma pair
of distributions notwithstanding, several results in this paper carry over to other
35signal-return distributions such as the normal-normal pair. Any distribution
in the exponential family possesses both a moment generating function and a
conjugate prior distribution so that the framework of this paper generally applies
to distributions in the exponential family. However, the marginal utility bene¯t
of signals will depend on symmetry properties and higher moments of the asset
and return distributions.
More substantive variations and extensions remain for future work. They
include an analysis of information values in complete markets, an investigation
of partially revealing equilibrium, and the consideration of investors who engage
in strategic demand decisions to partly conceal their information. However, the
key driving force behind results in the present benchmark with fully revealing
asset price is the diminishing e®ect of information on an asset's excess return
because a statistic of private signals is publicly inferrable from price. Neither
complete markets nor partially revealing equilibrium nor strategic investors can
make asset price completely uninformative, or else price would lose its entire
allocative function, so that information will continue to diminish excess returns
in those settings albeit in a mitigated manner.
36Appendix
A Optimality conditions and portfolio value
De¯ne t ´ ¡Axi 2 (¡1;0) for the moment generating function (MGF) MµjFi(t).











where Hi ´ expf¡A[(1+R)bi + Pxi ¡ W i
0 ¡ cNi]g. Dividing the latter by the
former equation implies equation (5) in the text as a necessary condition. Note
that Hi, W i
0, Ci
1 and Ci
0 are functions of Fi since RP depends on Fi.
With the de¯nition of Hi, the optimal portfolio value can be written





















where the second line follows from the bond ¯rst-order condition in (A.1).
The matrix of cross-derivatives for the two assets bi and xi re°ects the second-
order conditions:














by (A.1). If B is negative de¯nite, a unique global utility maximum results.
Equivalently, we require ¡B to be positive de¯nite and all upper-left sub-matrices
must have positive determinants. Since the upper-left entry in B is strictly


























since MµjFi(t) > 0. This condition implies that M0
µjFi(t)=MµjFi(t) strictly mono-
tonically increases in t, or strictly monotonically decreases in xi for t ´ ¡Axi.
37B Properties of the Poisson and gamma distri-
butions
Fact 1 in the text states how Poisson signals update beliefs about gamma dis-
tributed returns. This appendix lists further useful properties of Poisson and
gamma distributions
B.1 Poisson signals
Poisson distributed signals Si
njµ















Fact 2 (Poisson MGF). The MGF of a Poisson signal is
MSjµ(t) = expfµ(expftg ¡ 1)g:
Proof. Casella and Berger (1990).
Fact 3 (Sum of Poisson signals). The sum of N independently Poisson dis-
tributed signals with a common mean and variance µ, S1+:::+SN, has a Poisson
distribution with parameter Nµ.
Proof. The distribution of the sum of N independent Poisson variables is the
product ¦N
n=1f (si






n!, a Poisson distribution
with parameter Nµ.
B.2 Gamma returns
Given an individual investor i's information set f®i;¯ig, the risky asset return










(¯i)®i µ®i¡1 expf¡¯iµg=¡(®i) for µ > 0
0 otherwise
where the gamma function is given by ¡(®i) ´
R 1
0 z®i¡1e¡z dz. The two param-
eters ®i and ¯i must be positive.







Proof. Casella and Berger (1990).
38C Su±cient and necessary conditions for fully
revealing price
Corollary 1.1 Suppose expected utility is CARA (assumptions 2 and 3), sig-
nals are Poisson distributed and the asset return is gamma distributed (assump-






n in RICE if and only if
² signals are conditionally independent (assumption 1),
² investors know average prior beliefs, share a common degree of risk aversion
(assumption 4), know market size (assumption 6), and
² investors know the total number of all other investors' signals
PI
k=1 Nk at
the time of portfolio choice.
Proof. Proposition 1 establishes su±ciency. Necessity of assumptions 4 and 6
follows by inspection of the general solution for market price given individual
beliefs, based on heterogeneous priors, ®i = ¹ ®i +
PNi
n=1 si
n and ¯i = ¹ ¯i +Ni, and















































If investors have a common degree of risk aversion Ai = A, only knowledge of
the average prior beliefs 1
I
PI
i=1 ¹ ®i and 1
I
PI
i=1 ¹ ¯i is necessary to make price fully
revealing.
Assumption 1 is necessary since investor i would not know the correlation
between RP and her signals if perfect copies or correlated signals had been sent
to other investors. If
PI
k=1 Nk were unknown to investor i, she would not be






D Bond return response to stock return infor-
mation











39a permissible operation since ½i;R;MµjFi(¢) > 0 by their de¯nitions. Summing
up both sides over investors i and dividing by their total number yields
AR¹ b ¡ ln½iR ¡ lnMµjFi(t) ¡ Ac
PI
k=1 Nk=I = 0 (D.1)
where ¹ b ´
PI
i=1 bi
0=I is the average initial bond endowment per investor and t ´
¡Ax. Equation (D.1) implicitly determines the gross bond return R. Post noti-






Applying the implicit function theorem to (D.1) for the MGF of the gamma






A¹ b ¡ 1=R
for ® = ¹ ® + ¹ s;¯ = ¹ ¯ +
PI
k=1 Nk by (10) and » = A¹ x=¯ given
PI
k=1 Nk. The
bond return falls in response to a favorable signal realization ¹ s i® ¹ b > 1=(AR).
So, in principle, R too is a function of the signal realization ¹ s. For large bond
endowments ¹ b, however,
lim
b!1
dR=d¹ s = 0:
Similarly, dR=d¹ s = 0 for » = ¹ x = 0.
E Ante notitias expected indirect utility
The following property of the Poisson-gamma signal-return distributions proves
useful for the derivation of ante notitias expected indirect utility.
Fact 5 (Expected signal e®ect on utility). For two arbitrary constants B and »,
¹ N Poisson distributed signals S1;:::;S ¹ N and a conjugate prior gamma distribution





































where ¹ ® and ¹ ¯ are the parameters of the prior gamma distribution of µ, and
¯ = ¹ ¯ + ¹ N is the according parameter of the post notitias distribution.
40Proof. By the Law of Iterated Expectations Eante [¢] = Eµ [E[¢jµ]]. The `inner'




































n=1 sn is Poisson distributed with mean ¹ Nµ (fact 3). Thus,
by the MGF of a gamma distribution (fact 4),
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(¯ ¡ ¹ ¯)
´¡¹ ®
.
since ¹ N = ¯ ¡ ¹ ¯ (fact 1). Simplifying the last term and factoring out (1 +
»)B expf
»(!i¡1)
1+» Bg proves fact 5.
For a gamma distributed asset return, post notitias expected indirect utility
(6) becomes















where !i ´ xi
0=¹ x 2 [0;I] is the relative endowment of investors with the risky
asset, and » ´ A¹ x=¯. With fact 5 at hand, one can set B ´ 1=(1 + R) (by
assumption 7) and obtains ante notitias expected utility (14) for !i = 0 and (17)
for arbitrary !i 2 [0;I].
F Monotone marginal signal bene¯t schedule
(proof of propositions 3 and 7)
De¯ne the relative endowment of investors with the risky asset as !i ´ xi
0=¹ x 2
[0;I]: The expected relative excess return » is bounded by » 2 (0;»]. Under
assumptions 1 through 7, the potential marginal bene¯t MB(»;!i) of a signal is



































Proposition 3 is a special case of proposition 7 for !i = 0. The proof of
proposition 7 proceeds in four steps.
First, claim 1 sates useful properties of m(»;!i) for the discussion of g(»;!i)
and h(»;!i). Second, claim 2 establishes that the numerator g(»;!i) strictly
increases in » for » > j!i¡1j
p
1 + 1=R ¡ !i and that it is not bounded above.
So, the numerator boosts the marginal bene¯t MB(»;!i) higher and higher as
» rises. Third, claim 3 establishes that the denominator h(»;!i) is bounded
below and above in the positive range, and that it strictly decreases in » i® the
numerator is strictly positive. So, the denominator cannot explode and boosts
the marginal bene¯t MB(»;!i) higher where the potential bene¯t MB(»;!i) is
positive. The latter two claims imply that MB(»;!i) strictly increases in » for
» > j!i¡1j
p
1 + 1=R¡!i and that MB(»;!i) is unbounded for arbitrarily large
». So, fourth and last, MB(»;!i) ultimately attains strictly positive values and
continues to strictly increase in that positive range.
Claim 1 m(»;!i) strictly increases in !i; m(0;!i) = 1; and m(»;!i) > 1 for
any » > 0, !i ¸ 0 and R2(0;1).
Proof. By (F.1), @m(»;!i)=@» = m(»;!i)»=(1 + ») > 0, which establishes the
¯rst part of the claim.
Taking natural logs of both sides of (F.1) is permissible since m(»;!i) > 0
and shows that m(»;!i) ¸ 1 i® ln(1 + ») ¸ ¡»(!i¡1)=(1 + »). Since m(»;!i)
strictly increases in !i, consider !i = 0. So, m(»;0) ¸ 1 i® ln(1+») ¸ »=(1 + »).
Note that equality holds at » = 0 but ln(1+») increases strictly faster in » than
»=(1 + ») increases in » for any » > 0. So, m(»;0) ¸ 1. Since m(»;!i) strictly
increases in !i, m(»;!i) ¸ 1.
Claim 2 g(»;!i) strictly increases in » i® » > j!i¡1j
p
1 + 1=R¡!i. In addition,
lim»!0 g(»;!i) = 0 and lim»!1 g(»;!i) = +1.














So, @g(»;!i)=@» = 0 at » = 0 and at » = j!i¡1j
p
1 + 1=R ¡ !i (the negative
root is ruled out by » ¸ 0). Evaluating @g(»;!i)=@» = 0 around the zero points
shows that g(»;!i) strictly decreases in » if » 2 (0;j!i¡1j
p
1 + 1=R ¡ !i) and
strictly increases if » 2 (j!i¡1j
p
1 + 1=R ¡ !i;1).
lim»!0 g(»;!i) = m(0;!i) ¡ 1 = 0 by claim 1. lim»!1 g(»;!i) = ¡1 +
lim»!1 expf»=(1 + R)g = +1 since R2(0;1).
Claim 2 implies that there must be a »
i > j!i ¡1j
p
1 + 1=R ¡ !i that
uniquely solves g(»
i;!i) = 0 because g(»;!i) strictly decreases as long as » <
j!i¡1j
p
1 + 1=R ¡ !i) but subsequently strictly increases in ».
Claim 3 h(»;!i) strictly decreases in » i® g(»;!i) > 0. h(»;!i) is bounded in
h(»;!i) 2 (1;h(»
i;!i)] for » 2 (0;»] and R 2 (0;1), where h(»
i;!i) > 1, » is
given by (13) and »
i solves g(»
i;!i) = 0.
Proof. By (F.3), @h(»;!i)=@» < 0 i® g(»;!i) > 0. So, h(»;!i) attains its
global maximum at »
i, which solves g(»
i;!i) = 0, and h(»;!i) attains its global
minimum either for » ! 0 or for » ! 1. By L'H^ opital's rule, lim»!0 m(»;!i)=»¡
1=» = 0 so lim»!0 h(»;!i) = 1. Similarly, for R 2 (0;1), lim»!1 h(»;!i) = 1
while lim»!1 h(»;!i) = 1 + » expf!i ¡ 1g for R ! 0. This establishes that
h(»;!i) 2 (1;h(»
i;!i)] for » 2 (0;»].
Claims 2 and 3 imply that MB(»;!i) strictly increases in » for » > j!i¡
1j
p
1 + 1=R ¡ !i and that MB(»;!i) is unbounded for arbitrarily large ». So,





1 + 1=R ¡ !i solves g(»
i;!i) = 0, and »
i 2 (0;1) is independent of » and
unique given R2(0;1).
G Dominant investor valuation of signals (proof
of proposition 8)
De¯ne the relative endowment of investors with the risky asset as !i ´ xi
0=¹ x 2
[0;I]: The expected relative excess return » is bounded by » 2 (0;»]. Under
assumptions 1 through 7, the potential marginal bene¯t MB(»;!i) of a signal is
43MB(»;!i) = g(»;!i)=h(»;!i) by (18) with h(»;!i) and g(»;!i) given by (F.3)
and (F.2).
The ¯rst statement of proposition 7 follows immediately from appendix G
where a general proof of proposition 8 for any !i is given. Uniqueness is an
implication of the second statement in proposition 7. The proof of the remainder
of proposition 7 draws on properties of g(»;!i) and h(»;!i), which claims 4 and 5
establish. Claim 6 evaluates the potential marginal bene¯t MB(»;!i) of a signal
at !i = 1. Together, these insights give rise to the remaining statements in
proposition 7.
Claim 4 g(»;!i) strictly decreases in !i i® !i > 1 + R(1 + »). In addition,
lim»!1 g(»;!i) = ¡1.













where m(»;!i) is given by (F.1). So, @g(»;!i)=@!i = 0 at !i = 1 + R(1 + »).
Evaluating @g(»;!i)=@» = 0 around this unique zero point shows that g(»;!i)
strictly increases in !i if !i 2 [0;1 + R(1 + »)) and strictly increases if !i 2
(1 + R(1 + »);I]. So, lim!i!1 g(»;!i) = ¡1 for R2(0;1) and »2(;»].
Claim 5 h(»;!i) strictly increases in !i and is strictly convex in !i at any » > 0.


















Claim 6 The potential marginal bene¯t MB(»;1) is strictly positive at !i = 1 for
»>0,R>0. At !i = 1, the potential marginal bene¯t MB(»;1) strictly increases
in !i.
44Proof. At !i = 1, MB(»;1) > 0 i®
1








Note that equality holds at » = 0 but the left-hand side increases strictly faster
in » (it increases by 1=(1+R)(1+»)) than the right-hand side increases (which
increases in » by 1=(1+»)2[1+R ¡ »=(1+»)]) for any »R > 0. So, MB(»;1) > 0.


























since h(»;!i) > 1 by claim 3 and @h(»;!i)=@!i > 1 by claim 5 for »>0. A round
of simpli¯cations shows that inequality (G.1) is equivalent to







Note that this condition holds with equality at » = 0 but the left-hand side
increases strictly faster in » (it increases by »(1+2R»=») > ») than the right-hand
side increases (which increases in » by »(1+»)
¡ 1
1+R < »). So, @MB(»;1)=@!i > 0.
These claims help establish the second and third statements of proposition 7.
g(»;!i) attains its unique maximum in !i at !i = 1 + R(1 + ») by claim 4
while h(»;!i) strictly increases in !i but is convex. So, MB(»;!i) must attain
its global maximum for some !· < 1 + R(1 + ») given ». At !i = 1, MB(»;1)
strictly increases. This proves the second statement that MB(»;!i) must attain
its unique global maximum for some !· 2 (1;1+R(1+»)). The third statement
that MB(»;!i) > 0 in an open interval ­+ that includes [1;!·] ½ ­+ follows
because MB(»;!i) is strictly positive and strictly increases at !i = 1 for any
» > 0. So, MB(»;!i) > 0 in an open interval around !i = 1. MB(»;!·) is
maximal at !· so that the open interval ­+ must in fact extend to [1;!·] ½ ­+.
These facts at hand, the fourth and ¯fth statements of proposition 7 become
corollaries of proposition 3.
45References
Admati, Anat R. and Paul P°eiderer, \Viable Allocations of Information in
Financial Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, October 1987, 43 (1), 76{115.
Allen, Beth E., \Generic Existence of Completely Revealing Equilibria for Economies
with Uncertainty when Prices Convey Information," Econometrica, September
1981, 49 (5), 1173{99.
Avery, Christopher and Peter Zemsky, \Multidimensional Uncertainty and Herd
Behavior in Financial Markets," American Economic Review, September 1998, 88
(4), 724{48.
Barlevy, Gadi and Pietro Veronesi, \Information Acquisition in Financial Mar-
kets," Review of Economic Studies, January 2000, 67 (1), 79{90.
Benabou, Roland and Guy Laroque, \Using Privileged Information to Manipu-
late Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
August 1992, 107 (3), 921{58.
Bergemann, Dirk and Juuso VÄ alimÄ aki, \Information Acquisition and E±cient
Mechanism Design," Econometrica, May 2002, 70 (3), 1007{33.
Bhattacharya, Sudipto and Paul P°eiderer, \Delegated Portfolio Management,"
Journal of Economic Theory, June 1985, 36 (1), 1{25.
Bolton, Patrick and Christopher Harris, \Strategic Experimentation," Econo-
metrica, March 1999, 67 (2), 349{74.
Burguet, Roberto and Xavier Vives, \Social Learning and Costly Information
Acquisition," Economic Theory, January 2000, 15 (1), 185{205.
Calvo, Guillermo A. and Enrique G. Mendoza, \Rational Contagion and the
Globalization of Securities Markets," Journal of International Economics, June
2000, 51 (1), 79{113.
Casella, George and Roger L. Berger, Statistical inference, 6th ed., New York:
Duxbury, June 1990.
Chade, Hector and Edward E. Schlee, \Another Look at the Radner-Stiglitz Non-
concavity in the Value of Information," Journal of Economic Theory, December
2002, 107 (2), 421{52.
Citanna, Alessandro and Antonio Villanacci, \Existence and Regularity of Par-
tially Revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium in Finite Economies," Journal
of Mathematical Economics, August 2000, 34 (1), 1{26.
46and , \Incomplete Markets, Allocative E±ciency, and the Information Re-
vealed by Prices," Journal of Economic Theory, February 2000, 90 (2), 222{53.
Cripps, Martin William, Godfrey Keller, and Sven Rady, \Strategic Experi-
mentation with Exponential Bandits," Econometrica, January 2005, 73 (1), 39{68.
Datta, Manjira, Leonard J. Mirman, and Edward E. Schlee, \Optimal Ex-
perimentation in Signal-Dependent Decision Problems," International Economic
Review, May 2002, 43 (2), 577{607.
Davis, Ronald E., \Certainty-Equivalent Models for Portfolio Optimization Using
Exponential Utility and Gamma-Distributed Returns," in Kenneth D. Lawrence,
John B. Jr. Guerard, and Gary R. Reeves, eds., Advances in mathematical pro-
gramming and ¯nancial planning, Vol. 3, Greenwich, CT and London: JAI Press,
1993, pp. 69{108.
Easley, David and Maureen O'Hara, \Information and the Cost of Capital,"
Journal of Finance, August 2004, 59 (4), 1553{83.
, Soeren Hvidkjaer, and Maureen O'Hara, \Is Information Risk a Determi-
nant of Asset Returns?," Journal of Finance, October 2002, 57 (5), 2185{2221.
Einy, Ezra, Diego Moreno, and Benyamin Shitovitz, \Rational Expectations
Equilibria and the Ex-post Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, December 2000, 34 (4), 527{35.
Fama, Eugene F., \E±cient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work," Journal of Finance, May 1970, 25 (2), 383{417.
Foster, F. Douglas and S. Viswanathan, \The E®ect of Public Information and
Competition on Trading Volume and Price Volatility," Review of Financial Stud-
ies, 1993, 6 (1), 23{56.
Grossman, Sanford J. and Joseph E. Stiglitz, \On the Impossibility of Infor-
mationally E±cient Markets," American Economic Review, June 1980, 70 (3),
393{408.
Holden, Craig W. and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, \Risk Aversion, Liquidity,
and Endogenous Short Horizons," Review of Financial Studies, Summer 1996, 9
(2), 691{722.
Jackson, Matthew O., \Equilibrium, Price Formation, and the Value of Private
Information," Review of Financial Studies, 1991, 4 (1), 1{16.
and James Peck, \Asymmetric Information in a Competitive Market Game:
Reexamining the Implications of Rational Expectations," Economic Theory, May
1999, 13 (3), 603{28.
47Jordan, James S., \The Generic Existence of Rational Expectations Equilibrium in
the Higher Dimensional Case," Journal of Economic Theory, April 1982, 26 (2),
224{43.
Morris, Stephen and Hyun Song Shin, \Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-
Ful¯lling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, 1998, 88 (3), 587{97.
Moscarini, Giuseppe and Lones Smith, \The Optimal Level of Experimentation,"
Econometrica, November 2001, 69 (6), 1629{44.
Muendler, Marc-Andreas, \The Existence of Informationally E±cient Markets
When Individuals Are Rational,," CESifo Working Paper, October 2004, 1295.
ssrn.com/abstract=612142.
Nelson, Daniel B., \Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Asset Returns: A New Ap-
proach," Econometrica, March 1991, 59 (2), 347{70.
Popper, Helen A. and John D. Montgomery, \Information Sharing and Central
Bank Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market," Journal of International
Economics, December 2001, 55 (2), 295{316.
Radner, Roy, \Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the In-
formation Revealed by Prices," Econometrica, May 1979, 47 (3), 655{78.
Rahi, Rohit, \Partially Revealing Rational Expectations Equilibria with Nominal
Assets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1995, 24 (2), 137{46.
Rai®a, Howard and Robert Schlaifer, Applied Statistical Decision Theory Studies
in managerial economics, Boston, Massachusetts: Graduate School of Business
Adminitration, Harvard University, 1961.
Reny, Philip J. and Motty Perry, \Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational
Expectations Equilibrium," September 2003. University of Chicago, unpublished
manuscript.
Robert, Christian P., The Bayesian Choice: From Decision-Theoretic Foundations
to Computational Implementation Springer Texts in Statistics, ¯rst ed., New York:
Springer, 1994.
Samuelson, Paul A., \The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, November 1954, 36 (4), 387{89.
Veldkamp, Laura L., \Media Frenzies in Markets for Financial Information," May
2004. NYU Stern School of Business, unpublished manuscript.
Verrecchia, Robert E., \Information Acquisition in a Noisy Rational Expectations
Economy," Econometrica, November 1982, 50 (6), 1415{30.
48Wald, Abraham, \Foundations of a General Theory of Sequential Decision Func-
tions," Econometrica, October 1947, 15 (4), 279{313.
Wang, Jiang, \A Model of Intertemporal Asset Prices under Asymmetric Informa-
tion," Review of Economic Studies, April 1993, 60 (2), 249{82.
49CESifo Working Paper Series 




1374 Sascha O. Becker, Karolina Ekholm, Robert Jäckle and Marc-Andreas Mündler, 
Location Choice and Employment Decisions: A Comparison of German and Swedish 
Multinationals, January 2005 
 
1375 Christian Gollier, The Consumption-Based Determinants of the Term Structure of 
Discount Rates, January 2005 
 
1376 Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Jacob Engwerda, Joseph Plasmans, Bas van Aarle and 
Tomasz Michalak, Macroeconomic Stabilization Policies in the EMU: Spillovers, 
Asymmetries, and Institutions, January 2005 
 
1377 Luis H. R. Alvarez and Erkki Koskela, Progressive Taxation and Irreversible 
Investment under Uncertainty, January 2005 
 
1378 Theodore C. Bergstrom and John L. Hartman, Demographics and the Political 
Sustainability of Pay-as-you-go Social Security, January 2005 
 
1379 Bruno S. Frey and Margit Osterloh, Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats, 
January 2005 
 
1380 Oliver Hülsewig, Eric Mayer and Timo Wollmershäuser, Bank Loan Supply and 
Monetary Policy Transmission in Germany: An Assessment Based on Matching 
Impulse Responses, January 2005 
 
1381 Alessandro Balestrino and Umberto Galmarini, On the Redistributive Properties of 
Presumptive Taxation, January 2005 
 
1382 Christian Gollier, Optimal Illusions and Decisions under Risk, January 2005 
 
1383 Daniel Mejía and Marc St-Pierre, Unequal Opportunities and Human Capital Formation, 
January 2005 
 
1384 Luis H. R. Alvarez and Erkki Koskela, Optimal Harvesting under Resource Stock and 
Price Uncertainty, January 2005 
 
1385 Ruslan Lukach, Peter M. Kort and Joseph Plasmans, Optimal R&D Investment 
Strategies with Quantity Competition under the Threat of Superior Entry, January 2005 
 
1386 Alfred Greiner, Uwe Koeller and Willi Semmler, Testing Sustainability of German 
Fiscal Policy. Evidence for the Period 1960 – 2003, January 2005 
 
1387 Gebhard Kirchgässner and Tobias Schulz, Expected Closeness or Mobilisation: Why 
Do Voters Go to the Polls? Empirical Results for Switzerland, 1981 – 1999, January 
2005 
  
1388 Emanuele Bacchiocchi and Alessandro Missale, Managing Debt Stability, January 2005 
 
1389 Assar Lindbeck and Dirk Niepelt, Improving the SGP: Taxes and Delegation rather than 
Fines, January 2005 
 
1390 James J. Heckman and Dimitriy V. Masterov, Skill Policies for Scotland, January 2005 
 
1391 Emma Galli & Fabio Padovano, Sustainability and Determinants of Italian Public 
Deficits before and after Maastricht, January 2005 
 
1392 Angel de la Fuente and Juan Francisco Jimeno, The Private and Fiscal Returns to 
Schooling and the Effect of Public Policies on Private Incentives to Invest in Education: 
A General Framework and Some Results for the EU, January 2005 
 
1393 Juan C. Conesa and Carlos Garriga, Optimal Response to a Demographic Shock, 
January 2005 
 
1394 Christian Gollier, Optimal Portfolio Management for Individual Pension Plans, 
February 2005 
 
1395 Ruslan Lukach, Joseph Plasmans and Peter M. Kort, Innovation Strategies in a 
Competitive Dynamic Setting, February 2005 
 
1396 Gebhard Kirchgässner, (Why) Are Economists Different?, February 2005 
 
1397 Marko Köthenbürger, Panu Poutvaara and Paola Profeta, Why are More Redistributive 
Social Security Systems Smaller? A Median Voter Approach, February 2005 
 
1398 Gabrielle Demange, Free Choice of Unfunded Systems: A First Assessment, February 
2005 
 
1399 Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro, Sustainability of Portuguese Fiscal Policy in Historical 
Perspective, February 2005 
 
1400 Roel M. W. J. Beetsma and Koen Vermeylen, The Effect of Monetary Unification on 
Public Debt and its Real Return, February 2005 
 
1401 Frank Asche, Petter Osmundsen and Maria Sandsmark, Is It All Oil?, February 2005 
 
1402 Giacomo Corneo, Media Capture in a Democracy: The Role of Wealth Concentration, 
February 2005 
 
1403 A. Lans Bovenberg and Thijs Knaap, Ageing, Funded Pensions and the Dutch 
Economy, February 2005 
 
1404 Thiess Büttner, The Incentive Effect of Fiscal Equalization Transfers on Tax Policy, 
February 2005 
 
1405 Luisa Fuster, Ayşe  İmrohoroğlu and Selahattin İmrohoroğlu, Personal Security 
Accounts and Mandatory Annuitization in a Dynastic Framework, February 2005  
1406 Peter Claeys, Policy Mix and Debt Sustainability: Evidence from Fiscal Policy Rules, 
February 2005 
 
1407 James M. Malcomson, Supplier Discretion over Provision: Theory and an Application 
to Medical Care, February 2005 
 
1408 Thorvaldur Gylfason, Interview with Assar Lindbeck, February 2005 
 
1409 Christian Gollier, Some Aspects of the Economics of Catastrophe Risk Insurance, 
February 2005 
 
1410 Gebhard Kirchgässner, The Weak Rationality Principle in Economics, February 2005 
 
1411 Carlos José Fonseca Marinheiro, Has the Stability and Growth Pact Stabilised? 
Evidence from a Panel of 12 European Countries and Some Implications for the Reform 
of the Pact, February 2005 
 
1412 Petter Osmundsen, Frank Asche, Bård Misund and Klaus Mohn, Valuation of 
International Oil Companies –The RoACE Era, February 2005 
 
1413 Gil S. Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan, Lobbying and Compromise, February 2005 
 
1414 Marcel F. M. Canoy, Jan C. van Ours and Frederick van der Ploeg, The Economics of 
Books, February 2005 
 
1415 Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Wößmann, Does Educational Tracking Affect 
Performance and Inequality? Differences-in-Differences Evidence across Countries, 
February 2005 
 
1416 George Kapetanios and M. Hashem Pesaran, Alternative Approaches to Estimation and 
Inference in Large Multifactor Panels: Small Sample Results with an Application to 
Modelling of Asset Returns, February 2005 
 
1417 Samuel Mühlemann, Jürg Schweri, Rainer Winkelmann and Stefan C. Wolter, A 
Structural Model of Demand for Apprentices. February 2005 
 
1418 Giorgio Brunello and Lorenzo Rocco, Educational Standards in Private and Public 
Schools, February 2005 
 
1419 Alex Bryson, Lorenzo Cappellari and Claudio Lucifora, Why so Unhappy? The Effects 
of Unionisation on Job Satisfaction, March 2005 
 
1420 Annalisa Luporini, Relative Performance Evaluation in a Multi-Plant Firm, March 2005 
 
1421 Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni, When the Union Hurts the Workers: A 
Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy, March 2005 
 
1422 Pieter Gautier, Michael Svarer and Coen Teulings, Marriage and the City, March 2005 
 
  
1423 Ingrid Ott and Stephen J. Turnovsky, Excludable and Non-Excludable Public Inputs: 
Consequences for Economic Growth, March 2005 
 
1424 Frederick van der Ploeg, Back to Keynes?, March 2005 
 
1425 Stephane Dees, Filippo di Mauro, M. Hashem Pesaran and L. Vanessa Smith, Exploring 
the International Linkages of the Euro Area: a Global VAR Analysis, March 2005 
 
1426 Hans Pitlik, Friedrich Schneider and Harald Strotmann, Legislative Malapportionment 
and the Politicization of Germany’s Intergovernmental Transfer System, March 2005 
 
1427 Konstantinos Angelopoulos and Apostolis Philippopoulos, The Role of Government in 
Anti-Social Redistributive Activities, March 2005 
 
1428 Ansgar Belke and Daniel Gros, Asymmetries in the Trans-Atlantic Monetary Policy 
Relationship: Does the ECB follow the Fed?, March 2005 
 
1429 Sören Blomquist and Luca Micheletto, Optimal Redistributive Taxation when 
Government’s and Agents’ Preferences Differ, March 2005 
 
1430 Olof Åslund and Peter Fredriksson, Ethnic Enclaves and Welfare Cultures – Quasi-
Experimental Evidence, March 2005 
 
1431 Paul De Grauwe, Roberto Dieci and Marianna Grimaldi, Fundamental and Non-
Fundamental Equilibria in the Foreign Exchange Market. A Behavioural Finance 
Framework, March 2005 
 
1432 Peter Egger, Stefan Gruber, Mario Larch and Michael Pfaffermayr, Knowledge-Capital 
Meets New Economic Geography, March 2005 
 
1433 George Economides and Apostolis Philippopoulos, Should Green Governments Give 
Priority to Environmental Policies over Growth-Enhancing Policies?, March 2005 
 
1434 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja, An Interview with Thomas J. Sargent, March 
2005 
 
1435 Helge Berger and Volker Nitsch, Zooming Out: The Trade Effect of the Euro in 
Historical Perspective, March 2005 
 
1436 Marc-Andreas Muendler, Rational Information Choice in Financial Market Equilibrium, 
March 2005 